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gent actions by exploiting the physical characteristics of its own
body and its environment. Cognition is redrawn as a notion cen-
tered around intelligent behavior – or adaptive organism-
environment interactions. The newfound importance of timing
problems in cognition is a direct corollary of this organism-
environment interaction perspective. For successful behavior, it is
not only important to decide what should be done, but also in what
time-window certain initiated actions will be successful. What
cognition consists of is increasingly answered in terms of a capac-
ity for intelligent behavior rather than abstract thought. All of this
is mentioned by van Gelder as supporting the DH, but these de-
velopments would still stand if someone would prove that they
were perfectly reconcilable with the CH.
The derived importance of the DH becomes particularly obvi-
ous when a specific theoretical issue is considered: the use of rep-
resentations in cognitive science. The classical story is that the out-
ward behavior of cognitive agents results from an internally
represented program that initiates and guides the external behav-
ioral events, or the output for short – of course always in con-
junction with auxiliary feedback loops and other peripheral mech-
anisms. Van Gelder classifies this general idea with the CH,
whereas the DH would provide different options for the use of
representations or even their total abandonment.
We find the current dominant interpretation of representation
highly problematical; radical changes are needed to fit this notion
in cognitive science. Dynamical modeling, however, fails to pro-
vide the necessary leverage to initiate a change in the use of rep-
resentations in cognitive theorizing (Keijzer & Bem 1996). The
DH can be perfectly reconciled with a classical interpretation of
representations and the CH can be combined with different kinds
of representation. Any change in the notion of representation will
derive from changes in our ideas about how representational en-
tities function in cognitive theories (Keijzer, in press). The DH is
too general to take the leading role here.
The really important issue for cognitive science right now is to
extend our understanding of cognitive systems. Whether we will
prefer to call these systems computational or dynamical will be a
pragmatic decision, depending on what seems to be the most nat-
ural and efficient way to explicate and formalize these ideas. Given
the direction of current insights into cognitive processes, it seems
possible and even plausible that this will ultimately lead to some-
thing like the DH. First, however, it should be made clear what all
these dynamics are supposed to be the dynamics of.
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Abstract: The dynamics/computation debate recalls a similar debate in
the evolutionary biology community concerning the relative primacy of
theories of structure versus theories of change. A full account of cognition
will require a rapprochement between such theories and will include both
computational and dynamical notions. The key to making computation rel-
evant to cognition is not making it analog, but rather understanding how
functional information-processing structures can emerge in complex dy-
namical systems.
Is cognition about change or is it about structure? Van Gelder
clearly thinks that change is the essence: he champions dynami-
cal systems theory because “dynamicists are interested, in the first
instance, in how things change; states are the medium of change,
and have little intrinsic interest. Computationalists, by contrast,
focus primarily on states; change is just what takes you from one
state to another. . . . Computationalists focus on internal struc-
ture.” (sects. 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2)
Van Gelder’s formulation of this opposition – between dynam-
ics as focused on state change and computation as focused on state
internal structure – brings to mind a similar debate that has gone
on for years in the evolutionary biology community, and whose
resolution will, I believe, be instructive for the dynamics/compu-
tation debate in cognitive science. What accounts for the biologi-
cal phenomena we observe in the world? The predominant ex-
planatory framework has been neo-Darwinism, a theory of change
par excellence (inherited random change from one generation to
the next leads to adaptation by natural selection). However, some
evolutionary theorists have questioned the adequacy of classical
neo-Darwinism as either an explanatory or a predictive theory, and
argue instead for the primacy of historical contingency (Gould
1989a) or the self-organization of biological structure not due to
natural selection (Fontana & Buss 1994; Goodwin 1990; Kauff-
man 1993). These “historicists” and “structuralists” are the con-
nectionists of the evolutionary biology community – the people
questioning the classical orthodoxy.
The selectionist/historicist/structuralist debate was summa-
rized by Seilacher in his triangle of causal determinants of form
(Seilacher 1991), and has been discussed at length by Gould
(1989b), among others. It is becoming increasingly clear, however,
that the stark oppositions posited among these three frameworks
are not only false ones, but they are hindering progress in evolu-
tionary theory. The purely structuralist theories do not explain
how structures can be significantly changed in evolution, and the
purely selectionist theories do not explain what intrinsic driving
forces and constraints there are on the formation of biological
structures. What is needed is a theory that incorporates both
change and structure.1
Similarly, in cognitive science we have theories of change and
movement (“dynamical” approaches): how robots walk in a stable
manner (Beer 1995b), how babies reach and grasp (Thelen &
Smith 1994), how people move from a condition of uncertainty to
making a decision (Busemeyer & Townsend 1993). These theo-
ries, however, do not explain the information-processing content
of the states over which change is occurring; they either address
tasks that do not require complex information processing or they
assume high-level information-related primitives a priori. For ex-
ample, in Busemeyer and Townsend’s Decision Field Theory, de-
scribed in the target article, information-loaded notions such as
“positive and negative consequences,” “attention and shift of at-
tention,” “preferences,” and “motivation” are atomic primitives
(Busemeyer & Townsend 1993), and the theory does not attempt
to explain how these are implemented or why a particular
decision-maker might have one version of them instead of an-
other.
Likewise, in cognitive science we have theories of structure
(“computational” approaches) that make statements about the
information-processing structure of concepts, representations,
and beliefs (e.g., semantic networks, neural networks, schemata,
Bayesean belief networks, fuzzy logic, theorem provers). As van
Gelder points out, most of these theories assume that information
processing consists of the manipulation of explicit, static symbols
rather than the autonomous interaction of emergent, active ones
(Hofstadter 1985). Such theories typically cannot explain what dri-
ving forces and constraints there are on how the system in ques-
tion can change, what trajectories it can take, and how the high-
level symbols can emerge from a lower-level substrate.
Thus, as in evolutionary biology, cognitive science needs rap-
prochements between theories of change and theories of struc-
ture. Attempts at such rapprochements are coming from many
sectors, in particular from research on “complexity,” in which dy-
namics, computation, and adaptation are beginning to be viewed
in a more unified framework. For example, in our work on emer-
gent computation in cellular automata, my colleagues and I have
shown how active representations and functional information pro-
cessing can emerge from interactions among dynamical systems,
an environment, and an adaptive evolutionary process (Crutch-
field & Mitchell 1995; Das et al. 1994; 1995). This work is a pre-
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liminary step in understanding how useful computation can be
embedded in a complex dynamical system; it is one attempt at (as
van Gelder puts it) “dramatically reconceiving how [complex in-
ternal structures] might be instantiated” in such a system (sect.
6.9). In the end, van Gelder seems to agree that computational no-
tions – albeit of a nontraditional kind – might be important for
cognitive science: “the DH can embrace the idea that cognitive
processes are computational” (sect. 6.3). However, unlike van
Gelder, I do not believe that it is the digital/analog distinction that
is key for making computation relevant for cognition; instead, I
think progress will come from understanding how functional
information-processing structures can emerge in spatially ex-
tended dynamical systems with no central control, no globally ac-
cessible memory, and limited communication among compo-
nents. Computer science is gradually moving in this direction, and
I believe that many useful synergies between computation theory
and cognitive science will arise in the near future.
Van Gelder’s answer to objection 6.7 (“not as cognitive”) is 
that according to the DH “cognitive agents are dynamical systems
of quite special kinds” (sect. 6.7, para. 2). I will venture to say that
they are dynamical systems in which the states and state trajecto-
ries can and must be interpreted in functional, informational, and
information-processing terms, and the computational notions will
be necessary as well as dynamical notions for constructing a full
account.
NOTE
1. This formulation of the evolution debates was given to me by evolu-
tionist Daniel McShea (personal communication). McShea’s formu-
lation was elaborated by Crutchfield (1994), who proposes a particular
computation-theoretic notion of structure (“computational mechanics of
nonlinear processes”) and a related mechanism for the transformation of
structure (“hierarchical machine reconstruction”). Crutchfield suggests
that a unified theory of these two processes might be termed “evolution-
ary mechanics,” which he proposes as a general theory of “emergence.”
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Abstract: Technical hitches mar van Gelder’s proposed map of the con-
ceptual landscape, particularly with respect to descriptive levels and the
trio of instantiation, realisation, and implementation. However, for all the
formal quibbles, van Gelder is onto something important; the tension he
notes between computationalism and a dynamical alternative threatens to
transform the way we conduct cognitive science research.
The relationships of instantiation, realisation, and implementation
sit at the heart of van Gelder’s explication of systems in general
and of the computational and dynamical hypotheses in particular.
As presented, however, these relationships do not support the tidy
dynamical versus computational carving up of the world that van
Gelder’s project requires.
A central difficulty is that any finite sequence of empirical mea-
surements can in principle be described mathematically in infi-
nitely many distinct ways (the curve fitting of sect. 6.6). Any given
object instantiates not only a great many systems (sect. 3.1), but
infinitely many. Likewise for implementation: the weak constraint
that higher level variables are somehow constructed (sect. 3.1)
from those at lower levels leaves the relationship easy prey to 
“gerrymandering,” or wild ad hoc perversions of the spirit of van
Gelder’s idea that satisfy the letter of his account in unexpected
ways. Such inadequately constrained criteria render van Gelder’s
critically important claims about causal organisation awkward to
evaluate. They also invite inconveniences such as Putnam’s (1988,
pp. 120–25) proof that every ordinary open physical system triv-
ially implements (“instantiates,” for van Gelder) every abstract fi-
nite state automaton.
Perhaps van Gelder believes that the fundamental relationships
can be buttressed easily to support the required distinctions and,
crucially, to deliver the big prize of causal organisation that
grounds the project. Optimism here places van Gelder in good
contemporary company: Chalmers, too, believes that his own
single-paragraph description of implementation (Chalmers 1996,
p. 318) captures causal organisation. However, neither author ac-
knowledges that the subtleties of pinning down causal organisa-
tion occupy entire books (Kitcher & Salmon 1989; Nagel 1961;
Rescher 1970; Skryms 1980), having puzzled philosophers of sci-
ence at least since the inception of the “covering law” model in
Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) seminal paper. The nuances of
the problem trace their heritage back, ironically, to David Hume’s
own scepticism about “necessary connexions” in section VII of his
1748 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Although appeals to the compactness of a description do offer
useful constraints, sufficient to preclude some gerrymandering,
the concept is tricky. Van Gelder’s account of dynamical systems
(sect. 3.3, items 1 and 3), hides another glitch: in the general case,
the question of how succinctly something may be expressed is for-
mally undecidable. The subject merits a whole field of its own,
called algorithmic information theory (Chaitin 1987). At least one
usefully nontrivial account of implementation can be constructed
with the help of a somewhat tedious information theoretic analy-
sis (Mulhauser 1998), but the resulting view lends no support to a
strict demarcation between dynamics and computation.
These quibbles arise more from general problems in the phi-
losophy of science than from the dynamical hypothesis; in fact, the
account of computation van Gelder draws from Haugeland (1985)
stands, if anything, on even shakier metaphysical footing. Patho-
logical weaknesses in his appeal to correspondence frequently
serve for target practice by philosophers such as Sterelny (1990).
The upshot? Neither the dynamical nor the computational hy-
potheses is empirically meaningful in any strong sense: the un-
derlying concepts are too impoverished to support the necessary
taxonomy. (Similarly, “all oceans contain fish” would not be an em-
pirical hypothesis if our concept of “fish” were trivially open to
philosophical predation.) More relevant to the direction of em-
pirical work is not how different models are classified, but how
they enrich our understanding.
Indeed, the rhetorical elegance of van Gelder’s treatment
should not obscure the fact that both dynamical and computa-
tional descriptions, perhaps at different levels, may be invaluable
for understanding the same physical object. Real cognitive mod-
els rarely fall into a clean explanatory cascade anyway, neatly sub-
suming one another in relationships of logical supervenience;
more often, they are complementary, “horizontally” related, and
largely incommensurable. Therefore, van Gelder’s persistence in
referring to the highest relevant level of causal organisation seems
as odd as referring to the highest relevant integer for doing num-
ber theory; any particular level or integer may be too high, too low,
or just right, depending on the questions being asked. A privileged
set of the “right” questions no more exists in cognitive theory than
in number theory.
By way of analogy, consider possible explanations of my Macin-
tosh’s behaviour while it displays pictures of balls bouncing across
the screen. We could start at the (thoroughly dynamical) quantum
level, appealing to properties of semiconductor junctions to ex-
plain how changes in the computer’s internal components and ul-
timately its display screen occur so reliably and consistently, or we
might pick a software level to explain computationally how digital
values are copied to a display buffer and make their way to the
screen. Alternatively, the best predictor of displayed ball trajecto-
ries is probably some class of dynamical systems describing elas-
tic collisions. And in trying to understand “digital” Macintosh balls
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